Privacy Fallacies and Fatalism

Résumé

This text explores the phenomenon of privacy fatalism—the recurring belief that privacy is dead or dying—and connects it explicitly to the fallacies identified in Cofone’s The Privacy Fallacy. It shows how privacy fatalism has resurfaced across decades, accompanying each major technological shift from early photography to databases, the internet, big data, and now artificial intelligence.

The analysis argues that privacy fatalism stems from four interlocking factors: the emergence of new technologies that create novel and often opaque privacy threats; the impossibility of privacy self‑management within complex digital systems; perceived or actual public apathy toward privacy; and persistent skepticism about intangible privacy harms. These factors are intensified by legal frameworks that, as Cofone demonstrates, privilege material harms and ignore the systemic, relational, and inferential nature of many modern privacy injuries.

The contribution suggests that moving beyond privacy fatalism requires adopting the liability‑based, harm‑centered approach advocated in The Privacy Fallacy, expanding recognition of non‑tangible harms, and promoting cultural shifts that emphasize accountability rather than resignation. It concludes that although privacy fatalism may be a recurring cultural pattern, improved legal frameworks can meaningfully counteract its causes.

Mots-clés

Citation recommandée

Jonathon W. Penney, " Privacy Fallacies and Fatalism ", dans Nicolas Vermeys (dir.), About (and Around) Ignacio Cofone’s The Privacy Fallacy. Harm and Power in the information economy, (2026) 31-2 Lex Electronica 60-77. En ligne : https://lexelectronica.openum.ca/s/3720.
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